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STATE JURISDICTION OVER TORTS ARISING FROM
FEDERALLY COGNIZABLE LABOR DISPUTES*
IN the absence of a comprehensive congressional statement enumerating the
labor activities which are governed exclusively by the Taft-Hartley Act,' courts
have had difficulty separating those elements of a labor dispute subject to state
control from those solely within the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board.2 Three basic jurisdictional problems have arisen. First, to
*International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
1. Section 7 of Taft-Hartley provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities ....
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952). The heart of the act is the code of unfair
labor practices provided in § 8. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952). The most
important of these provisions make it illegal for an employer, § 8(a) (1), or a union, §
8(b) (1), to interfere with the employee rights granted in § 7.
Legislative history throws no light on the extent to which these provisions pre-empt
state action.
2. See Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); id. at 544, 547 (dissenting opinion);
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953) ("The national Labor Management
Relations Act [Taft-Hartley], as we have pointed out, leaves much to the states, though
Congress has refrained from telling us how much. We must spell out from conflicting
areas of congressional will the areas in which state action is still permissible."); Cox,
Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297, 1347-48 (1954) ("Con-
gress has left the problems of preemption to the Court") ; Rose, The Labor Management
Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L. REv. 765, 810 (1953)
("Congress itself has not been clear as to its aims and therefore it is not surprising that
many of the courts have also been confused as to the principles involved."). But see Note,
9 S.C.L.Q. 242, 251. (1957) ("[S]ince Congress was aware of the preemption problem, it
took care to reserve for state action only those areas in the L.M.R.A. which provide that
state regulations could be operative.").
Taft-Hartley provides a code of labor practices for most employees whose activities
"affect interstate commerce." The statute makes no attempt to divide jurisdiction over
labor relations between the NLRB and the states. The only reference to state jurisdiction
is contained in § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1952), which says that federal
and state courts may award damages for losses induced by violations of § 8(b) (4), 61
Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1952). Section 303 has not been construed to indicate
the congressionally intended scope of state authority. See United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1954).
Commentators have differed over the labor activities that should be subject to state
jurisdiction. Some have stated that all federally protected activity should be handled
solely through the NLRB. E.g., Brody, Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age in Labor
Relations, 5 LAB. L.J. 743 (1954) ; Feldblum, Some Aspects of Mindrity Union Pickcting
int New York, 20 FORDHAm L. Rav. 176 (1951); Ratner, Problems of Federal-State
Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 3 LAB. L.J. 750 (1952) ; Note, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 258
(1953). Others have maintained that Congress intended to permit concurrent state-
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prevent the states from circumscribing nationally guaranteed employee rights,
the Supreme Court has held that state legislatures and courts are pre-empted 3
from restricting conduct which the act specifically protects, even when the
conduct violates an otherwise valid state policy.4 On the other hand, the Court
has indicated that if labor's methods or goals are neither protected nor pro-
federal jurisdiction over all labor disputes. E.g., Petro, Federal Pre-emption--A Comment,
33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 691 (1958); Rose, supra. And others have found congressional intent
unclear. E.g., Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L.
REv. 959, 964 (1954); Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations, 46 Mica. L. Ray. 593, 594 (1948). See generally Cox, supra; Isaacson, Labor
Relations Law: Federal Versus State Jurisdiction, 42 A.B.A.J. 415 (1956).
3. The pre-emption doctrine excludes state action that conflicts with a comprehensive
scheme of congressional regulation. See generally POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAI. INTERPRETATION 49-87, 142-79 (1956). For discussions of the pre-
emption doctrine as applied to labor law, see articles by Petro, Ratner, and Isaacson, supra
note 2. Recent congressional dissatisfaction with the judicial pre-emption of state legis-
lation resulted in a bill providing that no state law shall be superseded by an act of
Congress unless in direct and irreconcilable conflict with federal statutes, or unless Con-
gress expressly excludes state action. The bill passed the House but was defeated in
the Senate by a single vote. N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1958, p. 1, col. 5.
4. E.g., UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956) (union not
filing federally required financial reports and noncommunist affidavits may not be pre-
vented from peaceful picketing by state) ; Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. Employees
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951) (strike by public utility
workers not enjoinable by state labor board under state anti-strike law); International
Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) (state statute requiring ten-day advance
strike notice and majority strike vote pre-empted by Taft-Hartley's collective bargaining
provisions) ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (federal act pre-empts state statute
requiring ten years citizenship, no felony convictions, and good moral character for-union
business agents, plus filing of annual reports) ; United Steelworkers v. Fuqua, 152 F. Supp.
591 (W.D. Ky. 1957) ($25 license fee for organizers invalid as burden on interstate
commerce).
Recognizing the pre-emption doctrine, state courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction
over labor controversies. See, e.g., Sterling v. Local 435, Liberty Ass'n of Steam Fitters,
207 Md. 132, 113 A.2d 389 (1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955) (refusing injunction
and back pay for union discrimination resulting in unemployment; court assumed the
union conduct constituted a tort justifying punitive damages); Busch & Sons v. Retail
Union, 15 N.J. 226, 104 A.2d 448 (1954) (refusing injunction); Mahoney v. Sailors'
Union, 45 Wash. 2d 453, 275 P.2d 440 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915 (1955) (refusing
injunction and compensatory damages for closed-shop violation). For collected cases,
see Hays, supra note 2, at 975 n.53; Isaacson, supra note 2, at 484 n.34.
Taft-Hartley also pre-empts the federal judiciary from exercising original juris-
diction over labor disputes. See, e.g., Born v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1954)
(earnings lost because of wrongful refusal to reinstate employee can be recovered only
through NLRB); Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167 F.2d 183
(4th Cir. 1948) (exclusive power to enjoin an unfair labor practice vested in NLRB) ;
New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Jenkins, 331 Mass. 720, 726-27, 122 N.E.2d 759, 763 (1954)
(collecting cases).
State arbitration tribunals may be pre-empted, NLRB v. International Union, UAW,
194 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1952), as may be fact-finding commissions of state labor mediation
boards, Grand Rapids City Coach Lines v. Hawlett, 137 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich. 1955).
And private parties may not contract to prevent the NLRB from exercising jurisdiction.
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hibited by the act, state tribunals may intervene-at least to enjoin violence or
potential violence-although the effect may be to interject local controls into
industrial disputes generally within the ambit of federal law.5 Lastly, the
Court has frustrated most state attempts to curb union activities which Taft-
Hartley denotes as unfair labor practices.6 The rationale given for so excluding
local regulation is that conflicting remedies should not be available for mis-
conduct explicitly covered by federal legislation.7
NLRB v. Walt Disney Productions, 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
877 (1945).
Taft-Hartley's pre-emption of state law, coupled with the NLRB's refusal to accept
cases involving less than $100,000 worth of business in interstate commerce, has created
a "no man's land" of unfair labor practices which cannot be handled by either the Board
or the state. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957);
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). And if the NLRB asserts juris-
diction but later refuses to act, state action is pre-empted. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
5. For examples of union conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited by Taft-
Hartley, see note 56 infra. The leading Supreme Court decision allowing the states to
enjoin concerted labor activity which is neither protected nor prohibited by the act
is the so-called Briggs-Stratton case. International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (union engaged in unannounced, sporadic
work stoppages).
6. See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1954) (Missouri injunction
against jurisdictional dispute which violated state antitrust laws disallowed because conduct
possibly violated Taft-Hartley ban on secondary boycotts) ; Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U.S. 485 (1953) (Pennsylvania injunction against organizational picketing invalidated
as conduct might constitute illegal coercion of employees under NLRA). The fact that
picketing after losing a representative election may be an unfair labor practice, Local 942,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists (Alloy Mfg. Co.), 119 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1957), may explain why
the Supreme Court reversed a state injunction against post-election picketing in Lodge
804, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cavett Co., 355 U.S. 39, reversing per curiam 166 Ohio
St. 508, 143 N.E.2d 840 (1957). And the fact that picketing for a closed shop is an unfair
labor practice, National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d
686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950), may explain why the Supreme Court
invalidated a state injunction against picketing for a closed shop in violation of a state
"right-to-work" law, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, v. Farnsworth & Chambers
Co., 353 U.S. 969, reversing per curiam 299 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1957).
State-ordered reinstatement of employees will also be pre-empted. Plankinton Packing
Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338 U.S. 953 (1950). Moreover, an em-
ployer may be enjoined from enforcing a state court injunction which conflicts with
federal policy. Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
7. Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any
tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. It went on to confine
primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially con-
stituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint
and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief, pending a final ad-
ministrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of
specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid those diversities and conflicts likely to result from
a variety of local procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies.
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953). See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 479 (1954).
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The Board's remedial powers are limited, however. The statute only author-
izes it to petition for the injunction of unfair labor practices, s to issue cease-
and-desist orders with respect to those practices,9 "and to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as
will effectuate the policies of this Act."'10 The NLRB has no injunctive powers
and may neither grant compensatory or punitive damages nor undertake
criminal prosecutions." As a result, the Court has recognized that the pre-
emption doctrine must not inhibit state proceedings designed to halt and
punish violence which occurs in the course of a labor dispute.'2 But for this
exception, the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices would insulate
unions from judicial measures necessary to preserve public order. Accordingly,
local injunction and criminal proceedings have been permitted in cases of
actual or threatened violence.'
3
8. 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1952).
9. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952) ; see Note, 67 YALE LJ. 325, 327
(1957).
10. Ibid.
11. Read literally, § 10(c) of Taft-Hartley, cited .rpra note 9, empowers the Board
to offer any remedy that it believes would "effectuate the policies of the Act." The
Supreme Court has established, however, that board action may only be remedial, not
punitive or compensatory (with the exception of back-pay awards). See, e.g., Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 543 (1943) ; Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 7, 10-11 (1940); NLRB V. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257
(1939).
12. The Court has deemed the preservation of public order such a traditional and
important state concern that it should not be pre-empted save by express congressional
mandate. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 751 (1952) ("[W]e cannot say that the mere enactment of
the National Labor Relations Act without more excluded state regulation of the type
which Wisconsin has exercised in this case."). State action has also been justified on
the ground that the proximity of local officials will often result in swifter action than
could be granted through present federal administrative or judicial machinery. 93 CoNG.
Rc. 4019 (1947) (statement by Senator Ives) ; Note, 53 CoLurm. L. REv. 258, 271 (1953).
13. E.g., Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., supra note 12 (leading case; injunction) ; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355
U.S. 131 (1957) (injunction); International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (same). For federal approval of state criminal
prosecutions, see Ackerman v. International Longshoremen's Union, 187 F.2d 860 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 859 (1951); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elea
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., supra at 751 (dictum). See also Note,
67 YALE L.J. 325 (1957).
For the view that Congress expected the states to enjoin violence and prosecute for
the violation of their criminal statutes irrespective of the fortuity of a labor dispute, see
Lipton, Misconduct in Concerted Activities Under the NLRA, 8 LAB. L.J. 299, 368 (1957).
Compare the statements of Senator Ives (violence need not be an unfair labor practice
"because offenses of this type are punishable under State and local police law"), 93 CONG.
REc. 4019 (1947), and Senator Pepper ("those who . . . are actually beaten up have
a right to redress under the [state] law"), 93 CONG. REc. 4023 (1947). Three Supreme
Court Justices (Warren, C.J., Black and Douglas, JJ.) have said, however, that state
injunctions against mass picketing, violence and threats of violence duplicate the remedies
19581
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The states have also granted tort damages for injuries to person or prop-
erty.' 4 In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, a 1954 decision, the
Supreme Court approved the states' exercise of tort jurisdiction by affirming
an award of damages for nonphysical injuries sustained in the course of an
unfair labor practice. 15 The defendant union had threatened the plaintiff's
employees with bodily harm if they remained in a different union 1 0 -a violation
of both state criminal law i7 and section 8(b) (1) (A) of Taft-Hartley, which
forbids coercing employees in this manner.1 8 The ensuing work stoppage
having caused the employer to lose his construction contracts, he sued in tort
rather than initiate action by the state or Board. A Virginia court allowed him
to recover compensatory and punitive damages for malicious interference with
available under the federal act and are therefore pre-empted. See, e.g., Youngdahl v. Rain-
fair, Inc., supra at 140 (dissenting opinion) ; UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 275 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
For examples of state injunctions against labor violence, see UMW v. Golden Cycle
Corp., 134 Colo. 140, 147, 300 P.2d 799, 801 (1956) (cut tires, slapping of mine official,
profanity, nails on roadway, mass picketing) ; Williams v. Cedartown Textiles, Inc., 203
Ga. 659, 664, 68 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1952) (overturned automobiles, shooting, throwing of
rocks, blocking of plant entrances) ; Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 369 Pa.
359, 85 A.2d 851 (1952) (150 pickets enjoined from congregating in three-foot doorway).
An isolated incident of abuse concomitant to a labor dispute does not justify state pro-
hibitions against all picketing, Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293,
296 (1943), unless the incident represents concerted, advance planning, NLRB v. Local
140, United Furniture Workers, 233 F.2d 539 (2d. Cir. 1956).
14. E.g., Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 85 S.E.2d 729 (1955) (nonunion employee
who was beaten during strike recovered compensatory and punitive damages) ; Tallman
Co. v. Latal, 365 Mo. 552, 564-65, 284 S.W.2d 547, 552-53 (1955) (remanding to trial
court to determine damages) ; Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 380 Pa. 3,
109 A.2d 815 (1955). For the argument that the state police power to prevent violence
implies state authority to offer common-law tort remedies, see Note, 27 N.Y.U.L. R~v.
468, 476 (1952).
15. 347 U.S. 656 (1954), affirming 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694 (1953).
16. Laburnum's employees were members of the American Federation of Labor. The
United Mine Workers attempted to reorganize them, and threatened to close down La-
burnum's construction work unless Laburnum recognized the Mine Workers' construction
union. When the company refused, a mob led by a union representative appeared and so
harassed the employees that Laburnum was compelled to abandon its contracts. 194 Va.
at 880-85, 75 S.E.2d at 700-03.
17. Although the Laburnum case was tried in Virginia, the actual violence occurred
in Kentucky. Various statutes that could have been used to prosecute the United Mine
Workers include: Ky. Rxv. STAT. § 433.310 (1955) (wilfully influencing contract laborer
to break his contract; $50 and damages); KY. REv. STAT. § 433:370 (1955) (attempting
to hinder intrastate commerce by violence; up to $200 fine and six months in jail) ; Ky.
REv. STAT § 435.200 (1955) (brandishing or flourishing a deadly weapon, loaded or un-
loaded; up to $100 fine and 50 days in jail) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 436.150 (1955) (profane curs-
ing or swearing; $1 for every oath) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 437.010 (1955) (breaches of peace,
riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies; up to $100 fine and 50 days in jail) ; Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 437.110 (1955) (conspiracy of two or more people to intimidate others; jury sets pun-
ishment).
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an advantageous business relationship.19 The Supreme Court upheld the Vir-
ginia judgment on the ground that the NLRB lacked authority to recompense
the employer for his loss, and that state tort jurisdiction over the case there-
fore produced no conflict of remedies.20 The Court also observed that the
NLRB enforces public rights, and that liability for tortious conduct is primarily
a matter of private law.21
Last term, in International Union, UAW v. Russell, the Supreme Court
extended the Laburnumn rationale to permit a state to redress a tort comprising
an unfair labor practice for which the NLRB was assumed to have a parallel
remedy. 22 A mass picket line had prevented Russell, a nonunion maintenance
worker, from entering his employer's plant during the progress of a strike
for higher wages.23 The strikers had inflicted no physical injury, but had
18. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (A) (1952). See generally Note, 67
YALE L.J. 1462 (1958). The union's conduct may also have violated § 8(b) (2), 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1952), by attempting to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee for other than the employee's failure to tender periodic
dues, Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 24-28 (1954).
19. In the original complaint, Laburnum asked for an aggregate award of $500,000
compensatory and punitive damages. The jury awarded the company compensatory damages
totalling $175,437.19 and puntive damages of $100,000. The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals reduced the compensatory award to approximately $30,000 and held that, on the
facts, Laburnum was not entitled to recover for alleged permanent destruction of a
business relationship or for damage to its business reputation. 194 Va. at 886-93; 75
S.E.2d at 704-09 (1953). Thus, Laburnum's net judgment was for approximately $130,000.
20. Here Congress has neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the tradi-
tional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious
conduct. For us to cut off the injured respondent from this right of recovery will
deprive it of its property without recourse or compensation ....
The care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing conflict between
state and federal administrative remedies in that case was, itself, a recognition
that if no conflict had existed, the state procedure would have survived.
347 U.S. at 663-65.
Justices Douglas and Black, dissenting, felt that a conflict of remedies and the possibility
of prolonged litigation and strife following an award of damages called for federal pre-
emption of the state action. 347 U.S. at 669-71.
21. 347 U.S. at 665. Compare National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 364
(1940); Agwilines, Inc. v. NLRB, 87 F.2d 146, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1936).
22. 356 U.S. 634 (1958), affirming 264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d 175 (1956).
23. Russell testified that he tried unsuccessfully for an hour and a half on July 18,
1951, to gain admission to the plant, Record, vol. 1, p. 32, but that a crowd, variously
estimated at from twenty to thirty pickets, blocked his passage, id. at 26. He remained
out of work until August 22, 1951. On cross-examination, Russell said that he did not
again attempt to seek admission to the plant but spent his time trying to organize a
"back-to-work" movement. Id. at 50-51. Nor did he ask for police protection or an in-
junction on the day he was unable to go to work. Id. at 54. The jury was charged by
the court that Russell could not be compensated unless the wages lost were those "which
he would have earned had he not been denied access to his place of employment.' Id.,
vol. 2, p. 636. In awarding him damages, the jury necessarily found that work was
available for Russell
1958]
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stopped Russell's automobile and threatened to overturn it.24 Given these
facts, Russell or the state could have caused the mass picketing to be enjoined,
and the state could have prosecuted the offenders.2 5 Furthermore, the NLRB
could have enforced section 8(b) (1) (A) 26 by issuing a cease-and-desist
order 27 and, arguably, by ordering the union to pay Russell his lost wages. -'
He did not seek relief under either local criminal or national labor law, how-
ever. Instead, he sued the union in an Alabama court for malicious interference
with his occupation. 29 He recovered $500 for lost wages and $9,500 in punitive
damages.30 Affirming this award, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding
24. Suing for back pay, damages for mental anguish, and a punitive award, Russell
made no allegation of threats or of physical injury to himself or his car. On direct
examination, however, Russell said that he heard a voice yell, "Looks like we're going to
have to turn him over to get rid of him." When he started to drive forward, pickets
pointed their signs at the automobile; some of the signs touched his car. Id. vol. 1, pp. 31-32.
25. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 274, 30 So. 2d
696, 701 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948) ; Shiland v. Retail Clerks, 259 Ala. 277,
280-81, 66 So. 2d 146, 148 (1953) (dictum) (injunctive relief).
The mass picketing probably could have been prosecuted under Alabama's general con-
spiracy statutes, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 99-104 (1941), under the penal code provisions
preventing riots and unlawful assemblies, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 407-14 (1941), and
under the state's general assault statutes, ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 33-41 (1941).
Moreover, Alabama's criminal code forbids the use of force, threats of force, or violence
to prevent another from following a lawful occupation. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 336
(1941) (up to $500 fine and one year in jail).
26. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1952).
27. See Local 1150, United Elec. Workers, 84 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949). See also Thorn-
hill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (dictum); Hall v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 72
F. Supp. 533, 536-38 (D. Hawaii 1947). If mass picketing is not coercive, the NLRB
will not prohibit it. United Elec. Workers, 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949) (workers informed
they would be allowed to pass through mass picket line).
28. The Supreme Court so assumed, arguendo. 356 U.S. at 641. The NLRB, however,
has found that it is powerless to order a union to grant an employee wages lost because
he was denied access to a plant during a strike. Local 983, United Bhd. of Carpenters,
115 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1956); United Mine Workers, 92 N.L.R.B. 916 (1950); United Furni-
ture Workers, 84 N.L.R.B. 563 (1949). The only court of appeals to pass on the issue has
upheld the Board. Progressive Mine Workers v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1951).
29. See generally Note, 9 ALA. L. REv. 118 (1956).
The trial court dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction; this issue was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which reversed and remanded for trial on the
merits. 258 Ala. 615, 64 So. 2d 384 (1953). A verdict for plaintiff was later upheld by
the state supreme court, 264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d 175 (1956), in an opinion which relied
on United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954), a decision which affirmed
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum, 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E.2d 694 (1953), which in turn
had found support in the first Russell decision by the Supreme Court of Alabama, supra.
30. The jury awarded Russell a lump sum of $10,000 without specifying how much
was compensatory and how much punitive. Since Russell earned approximately $100 a
week and the strike lasted five weeks, it can be assumed that his compensatory damages
were $500. Russell's suit was the first of many growing out of a single strike. Held in
abeyance pending the outcome of the instant case were twenty-nine similar suits, each
seeking $50,000 in damages. 356 U.S. at 657-58.
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that the NLRB's back-pay remedy constituted an available alternative :3 1 the
Court held that the possibility of recovering lost wages in either of two forums
was not the "kind of 'conflict' of remedies" requiring the federal pre-emption of
state tort law.
32
On its face, Russell appears to grant the states civil jurisdiction over all union
unfair labor practices which are also torts. True, the decision can be read to
limit state jurisdiction to those torts for which the act provides inadequate reme-
dies. In the context of a tortious injury, however, a suit at common law is
virtually always a more adequate source of relief than petitioning the NLRB to
seek an injunction or issue a cease-and-desist order or award lost wages or job
reinstatement.33 In fact, Russell apparently concluded that the Board's inability
to provide punitive damages rendered inadequate its presumed authority to
confer the back pay there sued for.
34
The Russell Court also did not restrict its decision to fact situations involving
union violence, that is, to those situations in which the states have injunctive and
criminal jurisdiction over federally cognizable labor disputes.35 Conceptually,
such a restriction would not be justifiable. The presence or absence of violent
union conduct, and hence of state jurisdiction over that conduct, has no necessary
connection with the commission of tortious unfair labor practices warranting
local, civil remedies. The character and severity of a given tort and the compara-
tive adequacy of federal remedies for the damaged plaintiff do not depend on
31. Id. at 641.
32. Id. at 644-45.
Chief Justice Warren, who had joined the majority in Laburnum, dissented for himself
and Justice Douglas, who had dissented in Laburnum. Justice Black took no part in the
consideration of the case; he had dissented in Laburnum. See note 20 supra.
33. The Board's discretionary power to petition for an injunction under § 10(j) of
Taft-Hartley, 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1952), is rarely utilized.
Mfanifestly, requesting the NLRB to petition for court injunction can be inefficient. Cease-
and-desist orders, once issued, impose no penalties and can be enforced only by NLRB
appeal to a court. Taft-Hartley Act § 10(e). The Board has interpreted its power to
order the reimbursement of back pay as limited. See NLRB cases cited note 28 supra.
34. See 356 U.S. at 641, 645.
35. In both Laburnum and Russell, the Court phrased the issue in similar terms-
whether Taft-Hartley has pre-empted the state courts from deciding tort suits arising in
the course of a labor dispute. 347 U.S. at 657; 356 U.S. at 635. In Russell, the Court
attached no significance to the presence of violence. Though the Court in Laburnum
discussed the violent conduct, it did not specify whether violence is a necessary prerequisite
to state tort jurisdiction. This ambiguity has provoked diverse interpretations of the
opinion's significance. In a subsequent case, the Court itself suggested that the Laburnum
holding was limited to violent conduct. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468,
477 (1955) ("Laburnum ... was an action for damages based on violent conduct, which
the state court found to be a common-law tort."). For similar interpretations of Laburnuin,
see Comment, 35 B.U.L. REv. 193 (1955); 54 COLUar. L. REv. 1147 (1954) ; The Supreme
Court, 1953 Term, 68 HARv. L. REv. 96, 144-45 (1954). Other cases and commentators
have reached the opposite conclusion. E.g., Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 233 F.2d 62
(9th Cir. 1956) ; Note, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 156 (1954) ; 40 VA. L. REv. 805 (1954). For
an intermediate view, see Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal Versus State Jurisdiction,
42 A.B.A.J. 415, 419 (1956) (Laburnum left the law unsettled).
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whether the union engages in violence-as when a union publishes a libel in
connection with a nonviolent unfair labor practice. Furthermore, state juris-
diction over union violence is premised on the need for maintaining order in a
civilized community.3 6 Tort damages, on the other hand, fulfill the entirely differ-
ent function of redressing private wrongs.3
7
Sound labor policy dictates, however, that the states' jurisdiction over unfair-
labor-practice torts be restricted. Otherwise, the remedial sections of Taft-
Hartley-integral to an act designed to foster labor-management harmony-
could be undermined. Recognizing the policy behind these sections, the Supreme
Court has established that congressionally proscribed labor activity may be en-
joined or punished by the states only when the maintenance of public order so
requires. 38 Similarly, the Laburnum-Russell doctrine should be limited, for
tort litigation can frustrate collective bargaining and hobble a union's eco-
nomic power as effectively as an injunction or a prosecution. Tort suits can
interfere with labor-management relations in localities hostile to unionism. 0
36. See note 12 supra.
37. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
38. The leading case is Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec. Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942), note 13 supra. Subsequent cases have
specifically restricted state injunctions which enjoin more than violent conduct. See,
e.g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), decided the same
day as Russell by the same six-to-two majority, supports the view that violence is not
a necessary prerequisite to state jurisdiction over private litigations. There, an arbitrarily
expelled union member had recovered $6,800 in lost wages and $2,500 for mental suffering
from his union. 142 Cal. App. 2d 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1956). No violence was involved.
Plaintiff's theory was that wrongful ejection violated the union's constitution and thus
breached a contract between the member and his union. The Supreme Court affirmed
the California judgment despite the fact that expulsion from a union can, under some
circumstances, constitute an unfair labor practice. The Court reasoned that since the regu-
lation of internal union affairs as such had not been undertaken by federal law, state law
should not be pre-empted merely because the conduct might be an unfair labor practice.
In a recent case similar.to Gonzales, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and thus
left standing a state court tort recovery of wages lost as a result of plaintiff's wrongful
expulsion from his union. Selles v. Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 50 Wash. 2d 660,
314 P.2d 456 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958). There, the Board had issued a
complaint before Selles withdrew his allegation of an unfair labor practice and sued in
a state court.
A case presently before the Supreme Court may indicate the reach of state tort juris-
diction over unfair labor practices arising out of nonviolent union conduct. Garmon v.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473, cert. granted, 357 U.S.
925 (1958). For prior opinions in Garinon, which is before the Supreme Court for the
second time, see 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955), vacated and remanded, 353 U.S. 26
(1957).
39. "Differing attitudes toward labor organizations will inevitably be given expression
in verdicts returned by jurors in various localities." International Union, UAW v. Russell,
356 U.S. 634, 651 (1958) (dissenting opinion). See Comment, 35 MfIcH. L. Ray. 602,
608-09 (1955) ("The Laburnum rule would leave each state free to develop its own rules
as to damage actions. . . without regard to the substantive rules of the NLRB or of sister
states") ; 35 TExAs L. REv. 142, 144 (1956) ("If the Supreme Court allows the principal
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Large tort damages in one state can drain union resources in all states.40 The
threat of tort liability may induce unions to refrain from legitimate activities
and may encourage employers to emigrate to areas where collective bargaining
is discouraged. 41 Tort litigation, serving primarily to expand the area of dispute
and to prolong controversy after the parties have resumed normal bargaining
relations, tends to subvert the national plan for minimizing industrial strife.4
Tort liability applies unequally to employers and unions, thus undercutting the
congressionally established balance of power :43 most union unfair labor prac-
tices violate the employer's common-law right to run his business without un-
justified interference,44 while an employer unfair practice which inhibits the
union's right to organize or bargain collectively breaches no interest recognized
by the tort law of most states.4 r
[Russell] case to stand .. .state courts can continue to exert a tremendous influence in
the area of labor relations.").
40. The potential damages arising out of the single strike involved in the Russell
case total $1,500,000, as twenty-nine other suits, each seeking $50,000 in damages, were
being held in abeyance until Russell was decided. Unlike most states, Alabama does
not admit into evidence prior punitive awards in mitigation of subsequent punitive verdicts.
356 U.S. at 657-58 (dissenting opinion). For the argument that punitive damages are
incompatible with national labor policy, see id. at 652-53 (dissenting opinion). For an
analysis of probable union strategy in similar future litigation, see Troy, The Supreme
Court and the Picket Line, The Reporter, June 26, 1958, p. 16.
In contrast, under § 303 of Taft-Hartley, supra note 2, punitive damages have not been
allowed. UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 749-50 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824
(1954), reversing 114 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Va. 1953). "After all, it [§ 303] is only to
restore to people who lose something because of boycotts and jurisdictional strikes the
money which they have lost." 93 CONG. Ryc. 4858 (1947) (statement by Senator Taft).
For the argument that the congressional policy disallowing punitive awards under § 303
should also prevent the application of punitive damages in common-law tort suits, such as
Laburnum, see Note, 6 HASTINGs L.J. 97 (1954).
41. See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. RExv. 1297,
1303, 1317 (1954) (enterprises in repressive states enjoy competitive business advan-
tages) ; Roumell & Schlesinger, The Preemption Dilemma in Labor Relations, 18 U. DET.
L.J. 135, 159 (1955) ("Should a non-uniform application of labor law be permitted, by
allowing states free rein in the enforcement of their own laws, a very great incentive is
created for the states to compete for the migration of industry by enacting harsh anti-
labor legislation."). Compare Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-88 (1937)
(national action required for social security legislation to prevent a few states from
defeating the social policy of all).
42. See Cox & Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HAnv. L. REv. 211,
229 (1950); Comment, 53 MicH, L. REv. 602, 609 (1954). Compare Ratner, Problem of
Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 3 LAB. L.J. 750, 766 (1952).
43. For this balance, see Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND.
L.J. 319, 323 (1951).
44. See 1 HARPR & JAMES, ToRTs § 6.7 (1956) ; PRossE, TORTs §§ 106-07 (2d ed.
1955).
45. See Friendly Soc'y of Engravers v. Calico Engraving Co., 238 F2d 521 (4th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 935 (1957). There, the union sued an employer for injury
resulting from the employer's malicious interference with his employees' right to organ-
ize under Taft-Hartley. The union alleged that the employer threatened to discharge union
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In order to conform the Laburnumi-Russell doctrine to the objectives of Taft-
Hartley, tort recoveries should be available only for injury flowing from certain
elements of an unfair labor practice, namely, those but for which the union's
activity would be protected under the act. Applying this standard, a state
court would first determine whether, absent distinguishable components of the
unfair labor practice, the union would have been engaged in protected activity.4
The court would then dismiss the action unless one or more of these critical
components was the source of the alleged tort. Thus, an 8(b) (1) (A) viola-
tion47 would give rise to tort damages only if aspects of the union's conduct
other than, for example, peaceful picketing inflicted the injury complained of.
Put the other way, a court would never impute injury to picketing as such, but
only to that conduct which rendered the picketing federally unprotected. In
the Russell situation, a trial court would not take jurisdiction over the subject
matter until finding that threatened violence caused the picketing to be coercive
and hence unprotected, and that plaintiff's injury resulted from the threatened
violence. The net result of this approach would be that the states could provide
supplemental common-law remedies for those torts which transmute union
activities into unfair practices, but could not redress the consequences of conduct
which, shorn of its unfair elements, Congress has sought to protect.
The proposed restricted application of Russell would leave undiminished
the states' authority to award damages for physical injury to person or
property. Inflicting harm of this sort is not protected activity.48 Limited, how-
ever, would be the common-law rule that a person is liable for all the economic
losses that he intentionally induces and not just for those resulting from tortious
conduct.49 If, for instance, mass or violent picketing accompanies a strike and
the union causes economic injury, an employer suing for trespass, injurious
falsehood or interference with an advantageous business relationship (for ex-
ample) would be unable to rely upon the fortuity of violence to recoup what,
had there merely been peaceful picketing, could not have been recovered.r0
organizers, clearly an unfair labor practice. Nylon Molded Products Corp., 116 N.L.R.B.
73 (1956). The complaint was dismissed on the ground that the Board had exclusive
jurisdiction. The court distinguished Laburnum by reasoning that common-law torts
could survive even though the same conduct was declared an unfair labor practice, but
that the creation of an unfair labor practice did not create a common-law action. To
hold otherwise, reasoned the court, would reduce the NLRB to impotency, as injured
people would seek judicial rather than administrative relief.
46. In making this determination, a state court would of course look to NLRB and
federal court decisions. If, in a given case, both the Board and a state court took juris-
diction, the latter should, if possible, conform its ruling' of law to the former's findings
of fact. But see note 60 infra.
47. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
48. See International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 645-46 (1958). See also
note 14 supra.
49. For the rule, see PRossEa, ToRTs § 106, at 745 nn.44-48 (2d ed. 1955) (collecting
cases).
50. In Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 124 F. Supp. 697 (D.N.M. 1954), a
state court was allowed to enjoin peaceful picketing in the employer's parking lot. Using
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To grant a greater recovery would be to ignore the statutory framework estab-
lished by Congress. Free collective bargaining and its concomitant economic
trials of strength between employers and employees require that many business
losses go uncompensated ;51 and the congressional remedies for unfair labor prac-
tices were undoubtedly intended to pre-empt the field with respect to such
losses.52 Protected activity would become hazardous indeed were tortious unfair
labor practices to render unions liable for the full economic consequences of work
stoppages.
The proposed restricted liability of unions finds additional support in the
fact that the states may not enjoin unfair-labor-practice strikes-only threats
to public order.53 Local authority to redress unfair-labor-practice torts should
likewise be limited to those which under no circumstances could be protected
activity. Also as in an injunction proceeding-where the employer must show
that, but for the violence, the injuries complained of would not ensue 54 -the
tort claimant should bear the burden of establishing that the conduct causing
his injury was unprotected irrespective of its status as an unfair labor practice.
Thus, in a Laburnumn situation, the employer seeking to recoup business losses
would be required to demonstrate that his employees would not have respected
a protected strike, and that they refrained from working because of the unpro-
tected threats of force.
Laburnun as precedent, the federal court reasoned that a state may enjoin the commission
of a common-law tort. All that a trespass requires, technically, is an entry upon an
employer's land. 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 1.5 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 13 (2d ed.
1955).
The tort of injurious falsehood arises from the disparagement of the plaintiff's business
or personality; an employee's disparaging remarks about his employer's products may
be unprotected under the act. NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S.
464 (1953) ; Maryland Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1950).
A tort might also occur between employee and employee as well as between employer
and employee. Battery, for instance, requires an intentional touching of the person
which is obnoxious to the person touched. 1 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS § 3.3 (1956);
PROSSER, TORTS § 9 (2d ed. 1955). And the shaking of a fist during a strike could con-
stitute an assault. I HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS § 3.5 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 10 (2d ed.
1955).
51. See Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479 (3d Cir. 1939) ("a strike
is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons") ; GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw
106 (rev. ed. 1949) ("[A strike] is a conflict or tussle.., in which the group of employees
on strike pit their economic lasting power against that of the employer."). See also FRANK-
FURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 199-205 (1930) ; Cox, Law and the Future:
Labor-Hanagenient Relations, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 240, 247 (1956) ("The strike is the
motive power that makes collective bargaining operate.").
52. Cf. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 479-81 (1955); Garner v.
Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
53. For state inability to exercise jurisdiction over unfair labor practices as such,
see cases cited note 6 supra. For state authority over violence, see e.g., Youngdahl v.
Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (Arkansas decree enjoining all picketing and violence
modified to enjoin only the violence).
54. See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., mupra note 53.
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Unfortunately, the foregoing proposal for handling unfair-labor-practice torts
is not applicable to the more difficult pre-emption problems arising from tortious
union activities which are neither protected nor proscribed by Taft-Harley.5 In
directing its attention to a limited number of abuses, Congress did not indicate
whether practices like "quickie" or "wildcat" strikes, product boycotts, and
strikes in breach of contract were to be left to economic warfare uncontrolled by
legal weapons, or were subject to state intervention on behalf of employers.50
Although it would be theoretically desirable to pre-empt state jurisdiction
whenever the concerted practice in question was implicitly sanctioned by a
congressional refusal to prohibit it, this standard would focus a court's attention
upon an uncertain legislative history rather than the desirability of state con-
trol. Attempting to resolve this problem, one commentator suggests that state
attempts to "regulate labor as such" be pre-empted, while local policies of
general applicability should be approved, even in the area of labor relations.r
7
55. For cases involving conduct neither proscribed nor protected, see, e.g., NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); Kelco Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 1766
(1951), enforced, 193 F.2d 642 (4th Cir. 1952). See generally Cox, The Right to Engage
in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
56. See International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 245 (1949) ("quickie" strike) ; NLRB v. Draper Co., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944)
("wildcat" strike); Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951) (product boy-
cott) ; NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953) (strike in breach of
contract). For a comprehensive list of activities held to be unprotected by Taft-Hartley,
see 1 CCH LAE. L. REP. ff 2210 (1957) (collecting cases); BNA LAB. REL. EXPEDITER
517, 679 (1954) (collecting cases). For differing interpretations of Taft-Hartley result-
ing from congressional silence, see note 2 supra.
The states have asserted jurisdiction over concerted activity found federally unprotected.
See, e.g., Benjamin v. Foidl, 379 Pa. 540, 109 A.2d 300 (1954) (union conspiracy to
deprive plaintiff of work); Baun v. Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, 46 Wash. 2d
645, 284 P.2d 275 (1955) (strike to have fired superintendent of mill reinstated).
57. Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297, 1313
(1954).
When a state is attempting to solve general problems, the danger of disturbing the
various interests in union organization and collective bargaining is much less
serious than when it is formulating statutes of common law doctrines based upon
evaluation of the very same range of interests that has to be considered in formulat-
ing the national labor policy. May we not say, therefore, that the distinction should
be drawn between statutes and rules of decision having general application and laws
which deal with labor-management relations as such?
Id. at 1321.
The states should be free to regulate the terms of collective bargaining agreements
by applying laws of general applicability, such as antitrust laws, insurance regulations,
and sundry criminal statutes, but not by singling out collective bargaining or labor
unions for special legislation.
Id. at 1320.
For a similar view, see The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 H~av. L. REv. 77, 142-45
(1958).
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The line between labor and nonlabor policy cannot be clearly drawn, however.5s
Besides, the Supreme Court has apparently allowed the states to enjoin
"quickie" strikes as such. 9 The clearest and most practical immediate solu-
tion, therefore, would be to permit the states to exercise civil and criminal
jurisdiction in all cases involving activities which are neither protected nor
prohibited by Taft-Hartley. If state intervention then were to obstruct federal
labor policy in some area, the Court or the NLRB could preserve the Board's
jurisdiction by redefining those activities protected under the act. In any event,
a long-term solution must await a congressional definition of those labor
disputes which are not subject to state or federal regulation.6"
58. The difficulties may be illustrated by Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council,
49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473, cert. granted, 357 U.S. 925 (1958). There, the Supreme Court
of California, by a 4-3 majority, allowed an employer to recover tort damages for economic
losses caused by concerted activities. The opinion rested in part on a state statute which
makes it a tort to injure "the person or property of another or ... [infringe] upon any of
his rights." CAL CIV. CODE ANN. § 1708 (1954). Certainly a valid state policy of general
applicability, the statute nonetheless applies such "indefinite!' standards in labor relations
as could easily frustrate the protective policies of Taft-Hartley. But see Cox, Federalism
in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297, 1321 (1954) ("Experience and
debate will be required to test the utility of this standard, but the line can be projected far
enough to hazard tentative opinions.').
59. There is no existing or possible conflict or overlapping between the authority of
the Federal and State Boards, because the Federal Board has no authority either
to investigate, approve or forbid the union conduct in question. This conduct is
governable by the State or it is entirely ungoverned.
International Union, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245,
254 (1949). But see id. at 253 ("[T]here was also evidence of considerable injury to
property and intimidation of other employees by threats and no one questions the State's
power to police coercion by those methods.").
60. Until Congress acts, the danger will exist that a state court and the NLRB would
come to opposite conclusions about the status of particular activity in a given case. For
example, the state could award tort damages for activity which the Board, in a separate
proceeding, might characterize as protected. Compare United Brick Workers v. Deena
Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 637, 642-43 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952) (affirming
state court award of damages under § 303 of Taft-Hartley), with NLRB v. Deena Art-
ware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953) (affirming con-
trary findings of fact by NLRB).
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